

The Big Picture: *How well are we doing?*








Duke of Edinburgh's Future Energy Conference,
29th November 2023


Dan Monzani

Managing Director, UK & Ireland, and European Hydrogen



Aurora provides market leading forecasts & data-driven intelligence for the global energy transition

- Power markets 
- Renewables 
- Storage 
- Electric vehicles 
- Hydrogen 
- Carbon 
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
subscribing companies




150+

transactions supported in 2022


Our market leading models underpin a comprehensive range of seamlessly integrated services to best suit your needs






In GB, electrification for heat, transport and hydrogen electrolysis will increase annual demand by 65% (to 498TWh) by 2050

Annual Power Demand
TWh



ACS Peak Demand
GW




- In line with the Government's decarbonisation agenda and target of net-zero emissions by 2050, electrification of heat and transport and production of hydrogen through electrolysis will increase total power demand by 196TWh between 2023 and 2050
- Decarbonisation efforts are expected to accelerate faster post 2030, with Government initiatives including the 2035 ban¹ on internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles and published hydrogen and heat pump targets
- Increases in ACS peak demand will be driven by the addition of EVs and heat pumps, while base peak demand remains stable due to energy efficiency gains

Hydrogen² Transport Heat Base power demand³ Previous forecast

1) Delayed by Government in speech on 20th September 2023 by 5 years. 2) Demand for Green hydrogen production from electrolysis; 3) Underlying power demand excluding heat, hydrogen and transport.

Progress is being made within the transport sector with more than 23% of new cars registered in 2022 being either Battery EVs or plug-in hybrids

New car registrations by fuel type
%




■ Petrol/Diesel¹ ■ Plug-in hybrid ■ Battery EV ■ Other

1) Includes self charging hybrids with limited zero emissions electric only modes

High heat pump deployment is likely the most cost effective decarbonisation pathway but a step change is needed in all scenarios

Total heat system costs, 2023-2050
£bn (real 2021)




Fuel cost share of total costs, %



■ CAPEX ■ Transition cost ■ OPEX ■ Fuel costs


- Total heating costs are lowest in the Max Heat Pump scenario, and are 23% lower than the Max Electric Resistive scenario

Total annual heat system costs
£bn/year (real 2021)



- Total annual heating costs remain similar between scenarios before 2035, at £30-40bn/year
- After 2035, total costs diverge, with Max Heat Pump falling to £40bn/year by 2050, while other scenarios cost £60-70bn/year.


Heat pumps installed vs. 2035 requirement
Heat pumps per 100,000 of population, selected European countries



- GB requires 31-34% of homes to be fitted with heat pumps by 2035 across all scenarios
- In our scenarios, by 2050, heat pumps are deployed in 83% (High HP) and 46% (High H2) homes.
- 72,000 HPs installed in 2022 (0.26% of GB homes)


Europe will see 448GW increase in variable renewables capacity by 2030 in a Central scenario, accounting for 48% of total generation

European installed variable renewable¹ capacity (Aurora Central scenario)



- Europe's installed capacity of solar, onshore and offshore wind grows by 3.5 times between 2023-2050, in Aurora's Central scenario.
- The increasing penetration of renewables on the system results in an increase in the RES share of generation to 48% and 69% by 2030 and 2050.
- The increase in variable renewables will lead to more variability in generation, creating a need for flexible supply and demand technologies.

Installed variable renewable capacity in 2030 (Aurora Central scenario)



Germany, Italy, and Spain have the greatest installed capacity of renewables by 2030, and together make up 50% of Europe's total.

In relative terms, the countries with the greatest increase in variable renewables between 2023-2030 are Italy, Poland and Romania, which all currently have relatively low installed capacity.


■ Offshore Wind² ■ Onshore Wind ■ Solar PV ■ xx% Variable renewables share of generation³

xx% Relative capacity additions 2023-30 (GW)

1) Defined as solar PV, solar CSP, onshore wind and offshore wind. EU27 plus UK and Norway, minus Malta and Cyprus; 2) Includes fixed bottom and floating offshore wind; 3) Considering all low carbon generation, we get to about 95% by 2050 (i.e. including hydro, nuclear, etc). 3) Total capacity of listed countries, not of the entire European Union.

These new capacity additions represent a potential cumulative investment opportunity in Europe of up to EUR464 bn

Total CAPEX¹ 2023 - 2030
 €bn (real 2022)



Most countries see a ramping up of offshore buildout in the 2020s due to subsidy support
 Great Britain and Germany are leading with the largest cumulative investment opportunities


Germany dominates CAPEX investment for onshore due to strong government support

Germany dominates CAPEX investment for solar PV due to strong government support
 Benefitting from high load factors, Italy also sees a high CAPEX spend on solar buildout

1) The figures represent net additions. 2) EU27 plus UK and Norway, minus Cyprus and Malta

The ambition of 50GW offshore wind by 2030 is increasingly out of reach: after 2028, we need to build nearly as much capacity as we have built to date

Total offshore wind capacity procured versus 2030 government target
GW




Takeaway 1: Despite recent policy missteps, deployment of renewables has been a GB success story. More progress is needed on electrification of transport and (especially) heat.




The speed of the energy transition in Europe is threatened by an increasingly constrained grid, requiring significant investment

The volume of wind curtailed due to thermal constraints is growing with RES deployment, leading to the cost of managing the transmission network system to increase substantially over recent years

 Annual cost of constraint management¹
£bn (real 2022)




 Annual cost of constraint management
€bn (real 2022)





1) Covers any actions taken due to limitations on transmission network, whether for thermal, voltage or stability reasons.

Expanding transfer capacities will require at least 300% more new infrastructure to be built in 2023-2033 compared to 2012-2022

Transfer capacity from major new build GW



Major new build line length km



Locational pricing offers theoretical solutions to grid congestion; both GB and Germany are currently looking into either zonal or nodal pricing



Nodal Pricing

- Prices and dispatch determined at the nodes for generators
- No European country has nodal pricing systems, However, outside of Europe it is established in the **CAISO, PJM, ERCOT** and **Singaporean** power markets.




Zonal Pricing

- Generators and retailers settle prices at an aggregate, or marginal, bid in the entire zone.
- Currently, bidding zones in Europe are mostly defined by national borders, the exception being Sweden and Italy that have intra-national zonal pricing



GB is debating the benefits of zonal versus nodal pricing zones

- The Department of Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) called for a consultation with important stakeholders to review current electricity market arrangements (**REMA**).
- The results, published in March 2023 indicate that the government will consider introducing nodal or zonal pricing zones.
- However, respondents were divided as to which market policy is best suited to GB needs. **Both options are going to be evaluated in the coming months.**




Potential zonal and nodal splits



Germany is considering introducing a zonal price split

- The EU Agency **ACER** has given the **TSOs of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden** until end of 2023 to conduct a bidding zone review
- In Germany, the possible introduction of zonal price zones leads to **political resistance**: While northern Germany, has much cheap wind power, southern Germany is the power-reliant industrial center
- Particularly Bavaria is worried about increasing power prices in the case of a price zone split



Potential zonal split

Renewables historically brought to market by subsidy schemes. However, policy-makers now seeking to balance deployment with market integration



Routes to market for solar PV and onshore wind projects



Subsidy Schemes

Feed-in Premium



- A feed-in premium (FiP) is paid to the generator to top up wholesale revenues

Contracts for Difference



- Increasingly, countries move towards CfDs, “top-up” payments equal to the difference between an awarded strike price and market reference price




Power Purchase Agreements

- PPAs are long-term contracts during which time the power purchaser buys energy at a pre-negotiated price.
- There is a loss of some capture price upside due to the off-taker price discount, however this is compensated for by having a lower hurdle rate, or WACC (typically 3-6% lower, depending on the structure of the offtake agreement)



Merchant projects

- Fully merchant projects experience higher risks and financing costs compared to subsidized or PPA-assets.
- Currently, we only see substantial merchant projects in GB. However, developers may hedge against some merchant risks with innovative set-ups such as **solar-battery co-located projects** 

CfDs and PPAs are increasingly dominating the markets, with merchant projects failing to clear the hurdle rate in most countries and FiPs schemes being increasingly phased-out

Capacity-based CfDs?



- Some reform options combine a capacity-based subsidy with merchant/PPA prices for generation

Unlevered cost of capital for solar and onshore wind at FiD, pre-tax, real¹

5.5 - 6.5%


7.0 - 8.0%

10.0 - 11.0%+

1) Representative for GB.

Net Zero power by 2035 could also result in a 30 GW (de-rated) undersupply of firm capacity, putting security of supply at risk

Expected capacity retirements and additions by 2035¹
GW, de-rated




Unabated thermal
 Abated thermal
 Other
 Nuclear
 Renewables

1) Expected retirements reflect publicly announced dates for nuclear plant closures, policy mandated closure of coal assets and retirements of existing CCGTs based on a 30 year technical lifetime. 2) Reflects expected and potential additions based on confirmed and announced projects in the GB pipeline. 3) Estimated capacity requirement in 2035 (de-rated) based on Aurora's Net Zero scenario. 4) Unabated assets that will need to close or be converted to meet 2035 Net Zero targets.

Sources: Aurora Energy Research, REPD, EDF, Drax

Takeaway 2: There is a pivotal debate now about the extent to which system integration can be most efficiently and speedily achieved through central planning or market design






Is wholesale price going to drop to the floor in a Net Zero world?

Wholesale baseload price

£/MWh (real 2022)




1) Aurora Central scenario forecast, October 2023 publication cycle. 2) Aurora Net Zero scenario forecast, October 2023 publication cycle.



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


Is wholesale price going to drop to the floor in a Net Zero world?

No – commodities continue to set the price more than half the time

Wholesale baseload price

£/MWh (real 2022)




1) Aurora Central scenario forecast, October 2023 publication cycle. 2) Aurora Net Zero scenario forecast, October 2023 publication cycle.

Are policy costs inexorably rising?

No – although many important policy choices remain

Illustrative policy costs breakdown for suppliers– Aurora Central¹

£/MWh (real 2022)




Capacity Market Supplier Charge Climate Change Levy Contracts for Difference (CfD) Feed in Tariff (FiT) Renewable Obligation (ROC)

Efficiency

- Move expensive early renewables fully amortised by mid-2030s.
- A net zero power system requires an addition 38GW low carbon generation capacity on top of the already expected 50GW wind and solar.
- Further policy choices could make the power system more or less efficient
 1. How efficient the future system will be at integrating renewables?
 2. Optimising heat decarbonisation can make a ~£20/MWh difference
 3. Where do the costs of industrial decarbonisation fall?

The bigger debate around affordability is not whether we can afford to decarbonise but how best to allocate costs

Total system cost components shares, %



Fairness

- Recovery of capital costs through levies, rather than wholesale power costs, will be a majority of power system costs
- Very little attention yet given to how costs are charged to domestic consumers with both efficiency and fairness effects
- Major gains for early adopters of flexibility (who also make the system more efficient overall)
 - ~10% lower average household wholesale costs for smart user in dumb world
 - Only marginal gains once everyone is smart
 - Enabling infrastructure, like distribution network upgrades, paid by everyone

Takeaway 3: Consumer costs are not bound to rise inexorably. There are real choices about efficiency and fairness that will determine the costs of the transition and who bears them.



Renewable capacity is expected to grow substantially across Europe, driven by decarbonization targets and rising commodity prices, with new capacity additions representing a potential cumulative investment opportunity of up to 464 billion €. But we are well behind the pace elsewhere, especially heat decarbonisation.



The speed of the energy transition in Europe is threatened by an increasingly constrained grid, with the cost of managing grid constraints increasing alongside renewables deployment and curtailment. Policy has to take a whole system approach to both deployment and integration.



There is nothing inevitable about inexorably rising consumer energy bills but policy costs now will make a material difference to the efficiency, fairness and therefore public acceptability of the transition.

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